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 Abstract—In  today’s  world  password  compromise  by  some 
adversaries  is  common  for  different  purpose.  In  ICC  2008  Lei  et  al. 
proposed a new user authentication system based on the virtual password 
system.  In  virtual  password system they  have  used  linear  randomized 
function  to  be  secure  against  identity  theft  attacks,  phishing  attacks, 
keylogging attack and shoulder surfing system. In ICC 2010 Li’s given a 
security attack on the Lei’s work. This paper gives modification on Lei’s 
work to prevent the Li’s attack with reducing the server overhead. This 
paper also discussed the problems with current password recovery system 
and gives the better approach.




In  the  client  server  relate  security system environment 
one of the most defensive e component is the client or user 
authentication module which allows the server to grant access 
and deny to others  [1].  In  today’s there are many methods 
available like PIN, secret question, biometrics etc. out of all 
previously methods the PIN methods used widely due to less 
complex, less costly etc.
There are certain problem can happen with PIN problem. 
One of well known is there are static password so they can be 
stolen  means  stealing  the  client  identity.  Some  attacks 
including phishing [2], malware (record the keystrokes) based 
attacks  [3]  and  shoulder  surfing  attacks  [4].  All  of  these 
attacks are previously described in [5].
The  focus of this  paper  is  the  virtual  password  system 
which  was  proposed  by Lei  et  al  in  [7],  [8],  secret  little 
functions in [9] and by Li in [6]. The proposed virtual system 
claimed secure again all the attacks previously given but in 
[6] proved that with on an average by decoding 2 encrypted 
messages the virtual  password system can be compromised. 
And the password can be useful to impersonate the user.
In  email  password  recovery  we  use  secondary  email 
address to reset the password which was compromised. But 
the  attacker  can  change  the  secondary  email  id  after 
compromising  the  password.  So this  paper  gives  proposed 
change in this problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section  gives  background  study  or  literature  study  which 
proposed  in  [7],  [8].  In  section  III  we  discussed  the  how 

modified system can prevent the attack discussed in  [6]. In 
section  IV  the  system  and  usability  with  clients  were 
explained.  Related work and  future expansion  are given  in 
section VI. 
II.BACKGROUND STUDY
A. The concept of Virtual Password
The  idea  behind  virtual  password  is  to  hiding  the 
password by generating fresh password every time or random 
password  every time.  The  server  and  user  share  a  virtual 
password which was composed of two parts. 1) A fixed secret 
password X=x1,x2,…xn , where each xi∈ Z and Z will be set 
of all  password characters.  2) For each login  section server 
will generate or user will provide with random salt Y= y1, y2,
…yn, where yi∈Z and based on this user will enter a virtual 
password K= k1, k2,…kn=B(X, Y) to clear the authentication 
the process.  So this  protocol is common challenge-response 
method following based on secret  key. In  section III  of [7] 
and section 3 of [8] Lei considered secret key is the fixed part 
so in [6] the authors had given a type of attack that possible to 
impersonate the user.
B. The virtual password system
The randomized linear  function will follow the steps as 
given below. The fixed password is given by X=x1,x2,…xn 
and  a secret  integer  a∈Z. the integer  chosen in  such a way 
that  gcd(a,Z)=1.  We  assume  the  Z={0,1,…,Z-1}  i.e.  the 
cardinality of set Z.
1. The server generates a random salt Y = y1 ··· yn
and sends it to the user, where yi ∈ Z.
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2. The user generates a random integer c ∈ Z,
calculates K = k1 ··· kn as follows:
– k1 = B1(x1,a,y1,c)=(ax1 +y1 +x2 +c)mod Z;
– ki = Bi(xi,a,ki−1,yi,c)=(aki−1 + yi + xi + c +
xi1)mod Z for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, where I + 1=((i +1) mod n)
+1. Then, the user sends K to the server.
3. For c =0,...,Z − 1, the server calculates K in the same 
way  as  in  Step  2,  and  checks  if  it  matches  the 
response received from the user. If no any value of c 
produces a match,  reject the user;  otherwise accept 
him/her.
Lei et al. claimed that  using radome integer c, the virtual 
password system is secure against multiple observer login. In 
[6]  authors  that  the  above statement  wrong  and  the  secret 
fixed password can be compromised successfully. They show 
using example.
Here  in  all  previous  work  there  were  some assumptions 
required  to be made.  If  we assume that  the random salt  is 
provide at login time than at that time user had to calculate 
the K and this can be detected in phishing or shoulder surfing 
attack easily. If we assume that user will come with random 
salt and password K for that  and at login time he/she enter 
both random salt and K and server will verify by decrypting 
K and compare with random salt provided by user ,  if both 
match than  user successfully login.  The other assumption is 
server will not records the previous random generated salts so 
reply attacks can be possible.
III. PROPOSED WORK
A. Modified Virtual password system
There are several ways we can defend the attack given by 
[6]. If we can send the value of c with each transaction than 
attacker does not know that  for which particular  c value the 
particular K value associate. So if we provide wrong c value 
for K value than  server will know that  attacker  is trying to 
gain the access so it will deny the login.
Here server will check for message that for which value of 
c , c∈Z the K is built. So if we assume the sufficiently large 
value of Z than the processing time of server will be increase 
in  the  distributed  environment  where  lots  of  users  are 
connected to server. So in that case sending c value with K in 
the  encrypted  form  will  save  the  server  time.  Another 
advantage  is  server  will  record  all  previous  c  values  used 
between user for the same password and after login user can 
see this values with date and time so reply attack using same 
c value not possible.
Now if user generates the random number every time than 
we do not require c value so modified algorithm is as follow. 
The  randomized  linear  function  will  follow the  steps  as 
given below. The fixed password is given by X=x1,x2,…xn 
and  a secret  integer  a∈Z. the integer  chosen in  such a way 
that  gcd(a,Z)=1.  We  assume  the  Z={0,1,…,Z-1}  i.e.  the 
cardinality of set Z.
1 The user generates a random salt Y = y1 … yn
and encrypts using public key of server  , where yi ∈ Z.
2 The user calculates K = k1 …kn as follows:
– k1 = B1(x1,a,y1)=(ax1 +y1 +x2 +c)mod Z;
– ki = Bi(xi,a,ki−1,yi)=(aki−1 + yi + xi + xi+1) mod Z 
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, where i + 1=((i +1) mod n)+1. Then, the 
user sends K and encrypted random number to the server.
3 The server decrypts the random number and calculates K 
in the same way as in Step 2, and checks if it matches the 
response received from the user.  If no match,  reject the 
user; otherwise accept him/her.
In  above steps we are not  using random number c. the 
other  way is to add one more step in  previously algorithm, 
send value of c with current time stamp decrypt under public 
key of server.  Server  will  cross verify the value of c so no 
need to check all values between 0 to Z-1. 
B. Email password system
The  problem with  current  email  password  reset/recovery 
system is given in introduction. If we want more security as 
reasonable cost than we require one more password that will 
be used to protect the secondary email id. So if the password 
for email id is compromised than attacker cannot change the 
secondary  email  id  without  as  he  not  has  the  second 
password. So in other words we can say that second password 
only come in picture when user want to change the secondary 
email id. Suppose that  user forgot the second password than 
to recover user simply make request and password or link to 
reset password will be send to secondary email id. 
Now consider  the other  scenario,  attacker  had  broken  or 
get the password for some email so now he had access to all 
that  email  system for which the hacked email  address were 
used for secondary email id. This attack cannot prevent by the 
above modified system. 
IV. SYSTEM AND USABILITY
A. Modified Virtual password system
In the [7] and [8] the concept of system and usability were 
discussed. The main aim of this is how quickly user can adapt 
the system. If we assume the user had mobile phone or laptop 
or some palmtop devices than  user  can  simple installed the 
application  which  is  freely available  on  internet  and  then 
enter  secret  key and  random  number  will  be generated  by 
application itself and then application give final key K which 
user enter at login time. So if we assume that user do not have 
any of above devices than it’s depending on user the ability to 
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do mentally.  So the  modified system had  same problem as 
previous system.
B. Email password system
In the present email system user has to give one password 
for doing all the stuff. But in new system user may require to 
remember  both  password.  We  assume  that  user  will 
enter/select both the password at registration time.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This  paper  try to modify the  existing  scheme to prevent 
attack  and  give the  minor  change  in  email  password  reset 
system  in  order  to  get  better  security.  In  future  may  be 
another attack can be possible or we can minimize the overall 
length as well as can have better scheme for email password 
reset so the attack which possible in proposed system cannot 
possible in future system.
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